Killertomato wrote:ATGMs were overegged as a threat in 1991. They can be suppressed by artillery and smoke much more easily than armor can, and by the end of the cold war, a lot of ATGMs in the stocks would have been unable to kill tanks in wide use from the front at all- with the exception of TOW-2A and really big ATGMs like Maverick, most of the ones that did were just entering service in 1991.
We'll likely never know, it's a pure hypothetical.
It... does? Relative to ground forces? If you keep the aircraft back for 96 days and send them in for 4 days they'll do a lot less.
Restricting it to ground forces is shifting the goal posts. The question was "What was the dominant weapons system in 1991?". Desert Storm showed what a tremendous force multiplier PGMs are, more important strategically and often tactically than MBTs.
Not vs. tanks. Vs. SAM sites, artillery concentrations, supply depots, bridges, yeah. Except for Maverick, no US airborne PGMs were supposed to be used against tanks on a regular basis at all. There simply weren't enough of them.
Don't forget Hellfire and TOW, the primary airborne PGMs meant to be used vs tanks.
And the Bradleys would always be in a support role, like BMPs and Marders. No IFV had the staying power to mix it up right up front. The primary weapon was always the tank.
We don't know that for sure, it's another hypothetical. IMO tanks are to WW3 on the ground as battleships are to WW2 navies: Thought to be the most important unit going into the war, but changes in the battlefield have rendered them ineffective in most scenarios for which they were designed.