About the 2 New Mig-29

[Guggy]

I think it was an official in a position of higher authority overriding what the engineers on-site said, and with the results we know

The dudes who worked there everyday did what they were able to prevent it, but the guy kinda strongarmed his way through and fucked everyone.

[Killertomato]

Yes, the RBMK rector was designed by a human so it technically is human error.

Wasnt it because some uneducated engineer that try to push the reactor's limit overboard? Thats what i heard, i never read deep into it

What guggy said + it was exacerbated by the insanely stupid choice to not have a containment structure. With one, it might have been three mile island. Without one, well, it was Chernobyl.

[CommanderDef]

Yes, the RBMK rector was designed by a human so it technically is human error.

Wasnt it because some uneducated engineer that try to push the reactor's limit overboard? Thats what i heard, i never read deep into it

What guggy said + it was exacerbated by the insanely stupid choice to not have a containment structure. With one, it might have been three mile island. Without one, well, it was Chernobyl.

It can't have a containment, because it's too large. It was made to be simple and cheap to build and also to produce Plutonium for army. Containment would double the cost and Soviets were thinking other way. Containment is american way. Also, containment prevents leak in case of water pipe rupture, not in case of hydrogen or nuclear explosion.

We got quite far from MiG-29 loadout. Keep the discussion going xD

[Xeno426]

Yes, the RBMK rector was designed by a human so it technically is human error.

Wasnt it because some uneducated engineer that try to push the reactor's limit overboard? Thats what i heard, i never read deep into it

I read a book on the whole thing written by an ex-Soviet nuclear engineer. One thing he noted was that other nuclear engineers knew the RBMK design was bad (the whole thing was designed by a thermal engineer), but they couldn't get the thing replaced.

It happened during a regular test of the turbine system to make sure that, in the event of a drop in water pressure, there would still be enough pressure going through the turbines to provide power for emergency shut-down. It should have been routine, but there were delays and the crew that was supposed to be performing the test--the experienced crew--clocked out and the next shift took over. A mostly green crew. For whatever reason, the auto-SCRAM system was shut off during the test and so was the safety system that prevented the rods from being removed as far as they were. Further, the control rods were graphite-tipped, meaning that when they are put into the reactor there is a spike in reactivity before the system is moderated. By the time anyone noticed something was wrong, the system was so far gone that introducing the control rods caused an immediate meltdown.

It was a comedy of human error, bad design, and a bad system. Accident reports were all need-to-know, so when there were other similar steam explosions at other plants the information on what went wrong was never disseminated to plants with similar systems; the pushed attitude of "nuclear power is completely safe" put people into such a complacent mood about it that safety was not properly observed; heading a nuclear plant was seen as a political feather in the hat, and so many of those at the very top of such plants (including Chernobyl) had no actual knowledge of nuclear physics or plant operation.

[Vulcan 607]

Yes, the RBMK rector was designed by a human so it technically is human error.

Wasnt it because some uneducated engineer that try to push the reactor's limit overboard? Thats what i heard, i never read deep into it

I read a book on the whole thing written by an ex-Soviet nuclear engineer. One thing he noted was that other nuclear engineers knew the RBMK design was bad (the whole thing was designed by a thermal engineer), but they couldn't get the thing replaced.

It happened during a regular test of the turbine system to make sure that, in the event of a drop in water pressure, there would still be enough pressure going through the turbines to provide power for emergency shut-down. It should have been routine, but there were delays and the crew that was supposed to be performing the test--the experienced crew--clocked out and the next shift took over. A mostly green crew. For whatever reason, the auto-SCRAM system was shut off during the test and so was the safety system that prevented the rods from being removed as far as they were. Further, the control rods were graphite-tipped, meaning that when they are put into the reactor there is a spike in reactivity before the system is moderated. By the time anyone noticed something was wrong, the system was so far gone that introducing the control rods caused an immediate meltdown.

It was a comedy of human error, bad design, and a bad system. Accident reports were all need-to-know, so when there were other similar steam explosions at other plants the information on what went wrong was never disseminated to plants with similar systems; the pushed attitude of "nuclear power is completely safe" put people into such a complacent mood about it that safety was not properly observed; heading a nuclear plant was seen as a political feather in the hat, and so many of those at the very top of such plants (including Chernobyl) had no actual knowledge of nuclear physics or plant operation.

Have you seen this girl who visits Chernobyl its pretty cool
https://www.youtube.com/user/bionerd23

[codextero]

For whatever reason, the auto-SCRAM system was shut off during the test and so was the safety system that prevented the rods from being removed as far as they were. Further, the control rods were graphite-tipped, meaning that when they are put into the reactor there is a spike in reactivity before the system is moderated. By the time anyone noticed something was wrong, the system was so far gone that introducing the control rods caused an immediate meltdown.

It was disabled on purpose because auto-scram + other safety systems would not let the team withdraw as many control rods as they did. The person running the test didn't realize that the output of the reactor was being lowered by Xenon poisoning (Xenon is a product of fission, and acts as a neutron moderator that reduces reactor output). The power level the reactor was putting out was not enough to do the test they wanted to do, so the safety systems were disabled to allow more control rods to be withdrawn than normal. Then when the reactor started outputting more power due to lack of control rods, the fast neutrons caused the Xenon to become Iodine and remove it's moderating effect, leaving an un-poisoned reactor that had only 1/10th of it's control rods in.

[Killertomato]

It can't have a containment, because it's too large. It was made to be simple and cheap to build and also to produce Plutonium for army. Containment would double the cost and Soviets were thinking other way.

Yes, the stupid way.

Containment is american way. Also, containment prevents leak in case of water pipe rupture, not in case of hydrogen or nuclear explosion.

Yes it does prevent leaks in case of hydrogen explosions. It did at Three Mile Island.

[CommanderDef]

It was disabled on purpose because auto-scram + other safety systems would not let the team withdraw as many control rods as they did. The person running the test didn't realize that the output of the reactor was being lowered by Xenon poisoning (Xenon is a product of fission, and acts as a neutron moderator that reduces reactor output). The power level the reactor was putting out was not enough to do the test they wanted to do, so the safety systems were disabled to allow more control rods to be withdrawn than normal. Then when the reactor started outputting more power due to lack of control rods, the fast neutrons caused the Xenon to become Iodine and remove it's moderating effect, leaving an un-poisoned reactor that had only 1/10th of it's control rods in.

You've got it a bit vice versa with isotopes, but otherwise right. Most of 135Xe is a product of 135I decay, half-life of this reaction is 6.6 hours. 135Xe is not a moderator, but absorber (one of the most powerful), that eats your neutrons from the system. 135Xe is either removed by absorbing a neutron, or by it's own decay, half-life 9.2 hours. During constant power level in reactor, these isotopes are in dynamic balance. When the power drops quickly, production of 135I goes down, but concentration of 135Xe goes up (it's not burned by neutrons and it's still created by decay of iodine from higher power level). Higher concentration of 135Xe pushes the power output of reactor down and if you don't wanna shut it down and wait until it's decayed (and they just couldn't wait a day), you have to pull the control rods out. They pulled like all of them, compensating the poisoning. They actually struggled all the night to keep reactor running and then found themselves almost critical on prompt neutrons when 135Xe concentration got low. SCRAMed, and the graphite tips of control rods have done the rest bringing local positive reactivity.

[CommanderDef]

It can't have a containment, because it's too large. It was made to be simple and cheap to build and also to produce Plutonium for army. Containment would double the cost and Soviets were thinking other way.

Yes, the stupid way.

Actually, not at all. VVER 440 has a different way of protection. Having a containment means you can't access the technology during it's work. It also limits any manipulations you need to do.

Containment is american way. Also, containment prevents leak in case of water pipe rupture, not in case of hydrogen or nuclear explosion.

Yes it does prevent leaks in case of hydrogen explosions. It did at Three Mile Island.

That's actually not true. The structure is strong enough to hold all the steam from primary, but not to withstand explosions. It's usually made for 0.4-0.5 MPa. In TMI they were lucky to have several small explosions and some portion of hydrogen went just away.

[Terracos]

To the aircraft part for others: when there is a suspicion that the load could damage the plane during flight, plane gets it's geometry measured. There are several reference points and distance between them is measured with precise laser device. That way you know if the load caused any deformation to the frame. Also, when you get a bomb load that is near, or over your limits, you simply don't go 5G, but fly like a bus with a 500 turn radius. Talking about this, the pylon limits should be related to max Gs during flight, otherwise they don't make much sense.

Even if you turn like a bus, the stress on the pylons can reach really high levels due to turbulences and vibrations. I am too lazy now but you could calculate the additional stress an overload causes to the base of the wing and the pylon. So even if you dont feel the high accelerations as a pilot due to your position, there can still be high forces onto the wing. Therefore there is also a maximal load limit.

Also the geometry check might be done under test conditions but in a conflict there is no time for such things, its more important to rearm the plane and bring it back in the air. Therefore you normally never overload a plane. Most of the time you fly even with less load then possible just to avoid any problems. IRL you dont see your plane as a one way suicide attacker (except you are so desperate like Japan in WW2).

study fluiddynamics (what I really cannot suggest )

It's not that bad (He says, shitposting on the forums rather then doing his fluid dynamics work for Thursday). However, Xeno, I cannot suggest that you study it because I suspect that the fact you can quote everything a company has ever done back to them will make you slightly more employable than me!

Go back and study

I tell you if you have to work in fluid dynamics but you never learned it, its a pain in the ass.